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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2007, five teenage girls were killed when the car in which
they were traveling crossed the center line of a two-lane highway and
collided with an oncoming tractor-trailer.1 The car exploded into flames and
all five girls were killed on impact.2 Upon review of the driver’s phone
records, police determined that the driver received a text message at 10:06:29
p.m. asking, “What are you doing?”3 The crash was reported to authorities
at 10:07 p.m.4
“Because text messaging requires visual, manual, and cognitive
attention from the driver, it is one of the most alarming distractions.”5 Fortyone states and the District of Columbia ban text messaging for all drivers.6
New Jersey goes even farther, not only prohibiting texting while driving,7
but also enacting a law that provides criminal penalties to drivers who injures
others while distracted by cell phones.8 Senator Fred Madden, a sponsor of
the bill establishing the statue, stated, “Sometimes those distractions can have
tragic results. That is why it is important to send a message that such
behavior must cease.”9
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Although public policy mandates a reduction in texting while driving,10
arguably this is a duty that should fall on drivers. However, New Jersey does
not stop there. In Kubert v. Best, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, imposed a new duty on remote texters.11
This Note will examine Kubert in regard to the new duty imposed upon
remote texters. This Note will argue it was unnecessary for the court to
formulate a new duty regarding a remote third party’s obligation not to text
the driver of a motor vehicle because the duty to avoid texting while driving
should fall solely on the driver. Section II will provide an overview of the
relevant case law regarding the creation of a new duty. Section III will
specifically examine the opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey in
Kubert. Finally, Section IV will analyze why the majority in Kubert was
incorrect to create a new duty for remote texters, how the court should have
come to a different result, and why the new duty created will rarely be met.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
“A duty is an obligation imposed by law requiring one party ‘to
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.’”12 In Kubert,
the court created a new duty that remote texters refrain from texting someone
whom they know is driving and who will read the text message.13 As this
was a case of first impression regarding the existence of a duty for remote
texters,14 the court analogized a remote texter to a passenger’s relationship
with a driver.15 The court reasoned that when a texter sends a message to
someone they know is driving who will read the message, the texter is
distracting the driver in the same way a passenger could.16 The court stated,
“When the sender knows that the text will reach the driver while operating a
vehicle, the sender has a relationship to the public who use the roadways
similar to that of a passenger physically present in the vehicle.”17 Thus, to
understand the decision reached in Kubert, it is necessary to examine both
the analysis New Jersey courts use in the creation of a new duty as well as
other instances where the courts have found passengers in a vehicle liable for
harm caused by the driver.
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A. Duty Analysis in Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus
In Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, the New Jersey Supreme
Court established that creating a new duty of care must be fair in
consideration of the circumstances while also addressing public policy
concerns.18 To determine fairness, a court must identify, weigh, and balance
“the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the
opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the
proposed solution.”19 The court determined that a duty based strictly upon
the foreseeability of harm and how the defendant should have responded does
not support traditional goals of tort law.20 A new duty should not be created
unless it formulates a rational rule that will uniformly remedy both current
and future issues.21
The Supreme Court of New Jersey pointed out that although the
foreseeability of an injury is a significant factor in determining the existence
of a duty, “[f]airness, not foreseeability alone, is the test.”22 In assessing
whether to apply a new duty of care, a court should focus on all the factors
discussed above and not allow foreseeability alone to dictate a new duty of
care.23
Although courts have the authority to establish a new duty of care, they
can also look to other torts theories when determining liability. To establish
liability for third parties, courts may examine whether parties fall into legally
recognized special relationships and also whether one party aided and abetted
the other party’s tortious conduct through substantial assistance or
encouragement.24
B. Liability for Passengers
Courts have generally recognized a duty does not extend to a third
party’s ability to control the conduct of another to prevent him from causing
harm.25 However, courts have found exceptions to this general rule by
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examining other tort principles such as the existence of a legally recognized
special relationship and aiding and abetting.26
1. Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee
Rather than pure control, courts have held that passengers may be liable
for the unlawful conduct of a driver if there is a special relationship or if the
passenger aids and abets the tortfeasor’s misconduct.27 In Champion ex rel.
Ezzo v. Dunfee, the court analyzed these exceptions to passenger nonliability.28
A special relationship exists when the passenger can exercise control
over the driver’s conduct.29 The court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which provides that a duty to control the conduct of another occurs if
“a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct.”30
Special relationships that are legally recognized include relationships
between a parent-child, master-servant, landlord-tenant, and guardianward.31 If a relationship does not fit into one of the special relationship
categories described, “the actor is not subject to liability if he fails, either
intentionally or through inadvertence, to exercise his ability so to control the
actions of third persons as to protect another from even the most serious
harm.”32
In Champion, the defendant, a front seat passenger, did not have a
special relationship with the driver who crashed an automobile and injured a
backseat passenger.33 The defendant was dating the driver at the time of the
accident,34 and the court held that the defendant’s relationship with the driver
did not qualify as a special relationship.35
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Id. at 827.
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The second “no duty” exception results if the passenger aids and abets
the driver’s tortious conduct through substantial assistance or
encouragement.36 A passenger who is merely a companion in the vehicle and
has not encouraged the driver to engage in tortious conduct is not liable for
the party’s conduct.37 Substantial encouragement does not require active
physical participation in the tortious conduct; rather, advice and
encouragement are sufficient to satisfy the test.38 The court cited several
examples when a passenger encouraged a driver to engage in a tortious act.39
Substantial encouragement was shown where a “respected . . . authority
figure” encouraged a minor driver to prove an automobile’s performance
ability.40 In Champion, the defendant was a companion, and there was no
proof she supported the motorist in driving while intoxicated.41 Although the
evidence showed the defendant did not object to the intoxicated driving, she
repeatedly told the driver to slow down, which was sufficient to demonstrate
the defendant’s behavior did not constitute substantial encouragement.42
2. Podias v. Mairs
The full duty analysis and aiding and abetting theory of negligence were
both illustrated in Podias v. Mairs.43 In that case, an intoxicated driver lost
control of his vehicle and collided with a motorcyclist.44 The two passengers
encouraged the driver to leave the scene of the accident and the motorcyclist
lying in the middle of the road.45 The passengers had cell phones and used
them numerous times following the accident, but they never phoned for
emergency assistance.46 As the motorcyclist lay injured in the road, he was
eventually run over by another driver.47
The Court held that the passengers owed a duty to the motorcyclist.48
Creation of a duty requires a court to balance factors including the “nature of
the underlying risk of harm . . . the opportunity and ability to exercise care to
36.
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Id.
926 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
Id. at 862.
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prevent the harm, the comparative interests of, and the relationships between
or among the parties, and ultimately, based on considerations of public policy
and fairness . . . .”49 Courts should also examine whether the defendant is
responsible for creating the harm and “whether the defendant had sufficient
control, opportunity, and ability to have avoided the risk of harm.” 50
Plaintiffs must prove a defendant knowingly provided substantial
assistance.51
By failing to assist the injured motorcyclist, the passengers were
responsible for his death.52 It was foreseeable the injured motorcyclist would
be harmed or killed when the passengers left him lying in the middle of the
road.53 Furthermore, the death “might have been avoided with little effort
and inconvenience . . .” had the passengers used their phones to call for
emergency assistance.54 The court determined that imposing a duty that
passengers assist an injured motorist under these circumstances was fair and
rationally related to public policy.55
Alternatively, the court determined that the passengers could be found
liable under the common-law tort theory of aiding and abetting.56 A
defendant can be held to have aided and abetted if he provides “substantial
assistance” to a tortfeasor.57 The factors a court must use to determine
substantial assistance are, “the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of
assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the
tort, his relation to the other [tortfeasor] and his state of mind . . . . ”58 The
court found that one could conclude the passengers either collaborated in or
encouraged the driver’s decision to abandon the motorcyclist because the
passengers were aware of the driver’s wrongdoing and wanted to disassociate
themselves from the potential legal repercussions.59 By encouraging the
driver to leave the scene of the accident, the passengers exhibited their
substantial assistance in preventing the driver from calling for emergency
assistance and fleeing the scene of the accident.60
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in Podias held that foreseeability was a factor to consider. Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v.
Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1261 (N.J. 2013).
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Id. at 867 (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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In summary, a third party generally does not have a duty to control the
conduct of another to prevent harm61 unless a special relationship exists or
the third party aided and abetted the behavior through substantial assistance
or encouragement.62 A court may impose a new duty, but the “duty [must]
derive from considerations of public policy and fairness,”63 and cannot hinge
completely on the foreseeability of harm.64 However, in Kubert, the court
created a duty for remote texters based almost entirely on the foreseeability
of harm.65
III. EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
In Kubert v. Best, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
considered whether seventeen-year-old Shannon Colonna (“Defendant”) was
liable when the person she was texting lost control of his car and severely
injured the Plaintiffs.66 The court found that she was not liable.67 However,
in so doing the court held “that a person sending text messages has a duty not
to text someone who is driving if the texter knows, or has special reason to
know, the recipient will view the text while driving.”68
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In September 2009, eighteen-year-old Kyle Best and Shannon Colonna
(collectively, “Defendants”) were friends who texted each other every day.69
On September 21, 2009, the Defendants texted each other sixty-two times,
ate lunch at Best’s home, and remained together until Best had to leave for
work.70 At 5:41 p.m., Best clocked out of work and texted the Defendant at
5:42 p.m.71 Best then left his job and began the drive home. 72 A record of
the Defendant’s text messages showed that at 5:48:14 p.m. the Defendant
sent a text to Best, and he responded at 5:48:58.73 The content of these text
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messages is unknown.74 Within seconds of his responding text, Best’s pickup
truck crossed the centerline of the road and struck the Plaintiffs who were
riding a motorcycle.75 As a result of the accident, both of the Plaintiffs
suffered severe injuries and lost their left legs.76
Best settled with the Plaintiffs, and he was no longer a party to the suit.77
The Plaintiffs sued the Defendant, arguing that she “aided and abetted Best’s
unlawful texting while driving, and . . . she had an independent duty to avoid
texting a person who was driving a motor vehicle.”78 The Plaintiffs argued
that the Defendant knew Best was driving because she texted him at 5:48
p.m., less than a minute before the accident.79 The Defendant moved for
summary judgment, arguing that she was unaware Best was driving and had
no duty to avoid sending text messages to him.80 The trial judge agreed and
granted summary judgment to the Defendant.81 The Plaintiffs appealed to
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, to overrule the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment and hold the Defendant liable under a
proximate cause theory of negligence for texting Best when she knew Best
was driving.82
B. The Majority Opinion
To begin, the court determined that the Defendant’s liability could not
be established through a special relationship or an aiding and abetting
theory.83 Special relationships are legally recognized relationships in which
one party can exercise control over another’s conduct.84 The Defendant and
Best were just friends, which does place them into a legally recognized
special relationship through which the Defendant could control Best’s
conduct.85
Aiding and abetting requires a passenger to have “actively encouraged
the driver to commit the negligent act.”86 To prove aiding and abetting, the
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Plaintiffs had to show the Defendant “urged Best to read and respond to her
text while he was driving,” which they failed to do.87
There was no evidence that by texting Best, the Defendant actively
encouraged him to respond.88 The Defendant sent one text message
approximately twenty-five seconds before the crash, and although the content
of the message was unknown, the mere sending of text messages, without
more, does not constitute active encouragement that the driver violate the law
by responding immediately.89
As for the Plaintiffs’ argument that the Defendant had a duty not to text
someone she knew was driving, the court determined that “one should not be
held liable for sending a wireless transmission simply because some recipient
might use his cell phone unlawfully and become distracted while driving.”90
A texter is not liable for merely sending a message to a specific recipient,
even if he knows the recipient is driving.91
Although the court found the Defendant was not liable, the court
determined that it was necessary to create a new duty for remote third party
texters.92 The remote sender “has a duty not to text someone who is driving
if the texter knows or has special reason to know, the recipient will view the
text while driving.”93 To breach this duty, the sender must know or have
special reason to know, the driver will read the message while driving and
will become distracted from the task of driving.94 Showing prior experiences
in which the recipient responded to a text message while driving can prove
knowledge or special reason to know.95
The court compared a remote texter to a passenger physically present
in a car who distracts a driver.96 Like a physically present passenger, the
sender of a text must avoid distracting the driver of a vehicle to protect
motorists sharing the roadways.97 A passenger would be liable for an
accident if the passenger distracted the driver by placing a photo in front of
the driver’s face and encouraging the driver to look at the photograph.98 The
court concluded the passenger’s purposeful distraction of the driver would
87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1226. See also Durkee v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742 (W.D.N.C.
2011) (dismissing a products liability claim against the manufacturer of a text message device in a
tractor-trailer and holding that the driver has a duty to avoid distraction by not viewing a message).
Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1226.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1228.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1226–27.
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constitute independent negligence, not aiding and abetting.99 In the same
way, a sender of a text message could distract a driver by encouraging the
driver to look and respond to a text message.100
The court believed foreseeability was crucial in determining whether to
impose a duty.101 If a party is aware their actions create a risk of injury, the
harm is foreseeable.102 A sender of a text message disregards a foreseeable
risk when he or she texts someone he or she knows is driving because “it is
foreseeable that a driver who is actually distracted by a text message might
cause an accident and serious injuries or death.”103 The court determined that
this foreseeable harm could be avoided relatively easily by refraining from
texting someone known to be driving who will immediately view the text.104
In this case, the Plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence to prove the
Defendant knew Best was driving and would view and respond to the text
while driving.105 The evidence showed that the Defendant sent one text to
Best while he was driving, but no evidence indicated she was aware Best
would read and respond to the text immediately while driving.106 Based on
the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that the trial judge properly
granted summary judgment for the Defendant.107
C. Judge Espinosa’s Concurring Opinion
Judge Espinosa agreed with the majority’s holding that summary
judgment for the Defendant was correct.108 However, in Espinosa’s view,
the majority should not have created a new duty specifically for remote
texters.109 Rather, Espinosa believed traditional tort principles, specifically
aiding and abetting and special relationships, provide ample guidance to
determine whether a remote texter is liable for an accident caused by the
recipient of the text message.110
Espinosa disagreed with the majority’s comparison of a remote texter
to a passenger physically present in a vehicle.111 He argued that a remote
texter cannot be held to the same standard as a passenger physically present
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Espinosa, J., concurring).
Id. at 1229–30.
Id. at 1230–31.
Id.
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in a vehicle because a remote texter does not have the ability to control the
driver’s actions.112 Furthermore, remote texters lack “first-hand knowledge
of the circumstances attendant to the driver’s operation of the vehicle that a
passenger possesses.”113
Espinosa did, however, believe a discussion regarding passenger
liability was useful.114 The Restatement (Second) of Torts and the New
Jersey courts have recognized two exceptions to passenger non-liability:
when a special relationship exists between the passenger and driver that
affords the passenger some control over the driver, and when the passenger
aids and abets in the driver’s tortious conduct through substantial
encouragement or assistance.115 The first exception was not applicable here
because the Defendant did not have a special relationship with Best through
which she could control his conduct.116 With regard to the second exception,
substantial encouragement is proven by showing the Defendant “knowingly
and substantially” assisted a party in completion of an illegal activity.117
Espinosa believed summary judgment should be upheld because the
Plaintiffs provided no evidence that the Defendant was aware she was
participating or furthering an illegal activity.118 Furthermore, the Defendant
was not present in the car and therefore, was unaware of the circumstances.119
The mere act of responding to Best’s text message did not prove any
substantial encouragement.120 Espinosa also commented that if a duty is to
fall on remote texters, it should be considered and decided by the
legislature.121
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority’s decision in Kubert to create a new duty for remote
texters was unnecessary. The majority’s comparison of remote texters to
passengers physically present is inappropriate because remote texters have
no knowledge of the circumstances of the recipient. Part A of this section
will discuss how the duty not to text while driving falls completely on the
driver. Part B will discuss how other tort principles do not support

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1230–31 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 876 (1965 & 1979)).
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1231 (citing Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J. 2004)).
Id. at 1232.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1233.
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establishing liability for remote texters. Part C will discuss how the new duty
created by the court in Kubert will rarely be met.
A. It Is the Driver’s Duty not to Text and Drive
The majority was incorrect in creating a new duty for a remote texter
because the responsibility not to text while driving should fall solely on the
driver. In Estate of Desir, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
creation of a new duty of care hinges on fairness.122 However, in creating
this duty for remote texters, the court in Kubert overlooked fairness in
exchange for what the majority believed to be the foreseeability of harm.123
While it may be true that texting while driving creates a foreseeable risk
of injury, this is a foreseeable risk that the driver alone holds. In Estate of
Desir, the court held that a duty which focuses on the foreseeability of harm
and how the defendant should have responded does not support traditional
goals of tort law.124 By creating a new duty for remote texters, the Kubert
court did just what the Supreme Court of New Jersey held was inappropriate
because a duty does not revolve around the foreseeability that harm may
occur. Furthermore, the foreseeable risk of harm is lessened by the sender’s
assumption that the recipient will not view and respond to the text message
until it is safe to do so.
The remote texter is entitled to the assumption that once the recipient
actually begins driving, he or she will not read or respond to text messages.
The majority even concedes that “the driver bears responsibility for obeying
the law and maintaining safe control of the vehicle.”125 The majority attempts
to overcome this rule by extending the duty only when the sender knows the
recipient is driving and will read the text while driving;126 however, this duty
is unnecessary because the driver is ultimately the person responsible for
avoiding texting while driving. Just as it is the driver’s responsibility to avoid
changing the radio station or talking to a passenger in a potentially dangerous
situation, it is the driver’s responsibility to avoid viewing a text message, not
the sender’s responsibility to avoid sending a text message. The State of New
Jersey has acknowledged this responsibility by enacting a law that provides
criminal penalties to drivers who cause injuries to others while distracted by
cellphones.127
122. Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1260 (N.J. 2013).
123. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227.
124. Estate of Desir, 69 A.3d at 1261 (arguing the goal of creating a new duty is advancing a public
interest and holding a duty that applied only to the facts of the case was not generally applicable
and thus did not advance a public interest).
125. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229.
126. Id.
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5.
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The analogy between a remote texter and a passenger physically present
in a vehicle is inappropriate because a remote texter cannot appreciate the
circumstances surrounding the recipient of a text message. Judge Espinosa
correctly asserted in his concurring opinion that a remote texter has no firsthand knowledge of the situation and no control over the driver’s actions.128
Drivers are aware of the illegality of texting while driving and the grave risk
of harm it can cause, and only drivers have the ability to avoid viewing and
responding to a text message.
In Podias, the court created a duty that passengers assist an injured
motorist when the injury was related to their actions, the harm was
foreseeable, and the harm could have been avoided with little effort.129 The
passengers’ physical presence allowed them the opportunity to assess the risk
of harm their actions created. A remote texter does not have the same
opportunity. The inherent nature of texting undermines this analogy because
texting is meant to be quick and can be done at almost any time, at any place.
Unlike a physically present passenger, a sender cannot hear background
noises or see the surroundings of the recipient to infer a dangerous situation.
Thus, using this comparison as a basis for creating a new duty of care is
improper.
The creation of a new duty of care requires a court to examine whether
a defendant is responsible for creating the harm by determining if the
defendant had sufficient control and ability to avoid the risk.130 Remote
senders of text messages do not have sufficient control to avoid the risk; the
control is in the hands of the driver. In Podias, the passengers had the ability
to control the harm to the motorcyclist by calling for emergency assistance
or allowing the driver of the vehicle to call for emergency assistance.131 In
Champion, the passenger, as the driver’s girlfriend, was not responsible for
creating the harm because she did not encourage the driver’s behavior and
had no ability to avoid the risk.132 A remote sender of a text message should
be considered a remote companion who similarly has no control over the
recipient’s automobile. The majority mistakenly held a remote sender has
any duty at all to avoid texting someone they know is driving, as the duty to
avoid texting while driving falls completely on the driver.
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B. Traditional Tort Principles Do Not Support Liability for Remote Texters
Although the court established a new duty for remote texters, the court
could not find the Defendant liable based on the new duty.133 In Judge
Espinosa’s concurrence, he argued that the creation of a new duty was not
necessary to dismiss the Defendant from liability.134 He argued that
traditional tort principles, specifically aiding and abetting or special
relationships, are sufficient to determine liability for a remote texter.135
Although these tort principles have been used in other cases as an exception
to the general principle of passenger non-liability, they will not be useful in
determining the liability of a remote texter.
1. Special Relationships
“A special relationship exists where the occupant has some control over
the driver . . . .”136 Special relationships are insufficient to establish liability
for remote texters because there is no element of control. Unlike a child on
good behavior around a parent, a child who is driving cannot feel pressure to
respond because he or she should not even be looking at their phone while
driving to know a parent has texted them.
Furthermore, establishing liability for remote texters through a special
relationship is difficult because the only special relationships recognized by
New Jersey courts are master-servant, parent-child, landlord-tenant, and
guardian-ward.137 Arguments may be made that husband-wife relationships
could be included in this special relationship category,138 but it is not one of
the relationships listed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the authority
adopted by New Jersey.139 Although special relationships may be beneficial
to determine liability in some circumstances, the small amount of special
relationships enforced will be insufficient to cover the majority of texting
relationships. For example, in Champion, the court held that the passenger
had no special relationship to the driver because they were just dating. 140
Special relationships would be helpful in determining liability only between
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the few relationships covered in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.141 As
such, special relationships will not be useful to assert liability for remote
texters in the majority of situations because many texters will not fall into
these legal relationships. Most importantly, however, the driver should not
even be looking at his phone while driving to know if the texter is a person
with whom he or she has a special relationship.
2. Aiding and Abetting
Liability for a remote texter cannot be established through aiding and
abetting, which requires substantial encouragement or assistance.142 As
illustrated in Champion, substantial encouragement requires a party to be
more than a companion to the tortious conduct.143 Sending a text message
creates a companionship rather than substantial encouragement because
either party can choose whether and when they respond. Substantial
encouragement cannot be established even where texters send messages
immediately back and forth because there is no requirement, and it is even
strongly discouraged, to respond to a message while driving. Unlike a
physically present passenger, a remote texter cannot offer substantial
encouragement because one cannot force a driver to view a text message. A
physically present passenger can encourage a driver to speed or drive
erratically because the driver will hear them, but a remote texter cannot urge
a driver to read a text message. The power is completely in the driver’s hands
to avoid viewing a text message and responding when he or she pulls over or
arrives at his or her destination.
One factor a court must consider when determining substantial
assistance is presence at the time of the tortious conduct.144 A remote texter
will never meet this element of substantial assistance because they will never
be physically present with the driver in the vehicle. Unlike Podias, where
the passengers were present and were aware of the risk created by
encouraging the driver to leave an injured motorcyclist in the road,145 a
remote texter has limited knowledge of the recipient’s circumstances and any
negligent act that may be occurring. To hold a remote texter liable for an
action they are unaware of and do not encourage is inappropriate.
Although aiding and abetting and special relationships provide an
exception to passenger non-liability in some circumstances, they do not
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support establishing liability for remote texters. It will be difficult to prove
in the majority of circumstances that a remote texter either falls into a special
relationship category or has the requisite knowledge to substantially assist or
encourage a driver to unlawfully text and drive. In Kubert, the majority
examined these principles and determined liability for the Defendant did not
exist.146 The court should have ended their analysis there and not gone on to
create a new duty—a duty the Defendant was not even found to have
breached.
C. The Duty Created Will Rarely Be Met
The duty of care created by the court in Kubert and the imposition of
liability will rarely be met.147 The court’s requirement that the sender of a
text message know not only that the recipient was driving, but also that he or
she would immediately view and respond to the message is an extremely high
burden and could not even be met in Kubert.148
In determining liability, it will be extremely difficult to establish
whether the sender knows the recipient of a text message is driving. The
majority’s argument that past experiences may provide the sender with
knowledge that the recipient will read and respond while driving places too
great of a risk on the sender. The inherent nature of texting is it is a quick
and easy way to get in touch with someone. The sender cannot hear
background noises and rarely has any clue as to where someone is when they
respond. Neither party has any control over when the other will view or
respond to the message. Thus, it is ridiculous to place a duty on the sender
of a text message to be aware of whether the recipient is driving, and if the
recipient is driving, to know they will look and respond to the text message.
Only the recipient of a text message can control when and where he or she
views and responds to the message, and the duty to avoid texting and driving
should fall completely on the driver, recipient.
The only scenario where it seems plausible that a remote texter may
have the requisite knowledge required to breach this newly created duty is if
two parties had a text conversation where the recipient admitted he was
driving. In only this scenario would a remote texter know with certainty that
the recipient is both driving and will respond regardless of the act’s illegality.
A remote texter would not have the requisite knowledge even if the recipient
texted he or she was about to drive somewhere because the remote texter is
entitled to the assumption that once the recipient actually begins driving, he
or she will not read or respond to text messages. Thus, the court created an
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unnecessary duty that will almost never be breached due to a lack of
knowledge by the sender.
V. CONCLUSION
Texting while driving obviously creates grave risks that can end in
serious injury or death; however, the majority in Kubert was incorrect to
impose a duty on remote texters. The majority’s comparison of remote
texters to passengers physically present was inappropriate because remote
texters have no knowledge of the circumstances of the recipient. By
examining traditional tort principals such as special relationships and aiding
and abetting, the court could have reached the same result that the Defendant
was not liable for the injuries to the Plaintiffs. The court should have stopped
their analysis after determining that the Defendant was not liable because the
duty to avoid texting and driving is a duty that falls solely on drivers. As
such, it should not have been extended to include remote texters. Finally,
because the imposition of liability for breaching the duty will rarely, if ever,
be met, the majority did little more than create a useless duty of care.

